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supra; McMakin v. McMakin, 68 Mo. App. 57 (1896); in re Floyd
Kinsolving, 135 Mo. App. 631, 116 S.W. io68 (19o9); Francis v.
Francis, 192 Mo. App. 710, 179 S.W. 975 (1915).
In summary, the majority of the courts of the country permit attach-
ment for contempt upon default regardless of the type of alimony
awarded. They invoke the following theories: (I) disobedience of a
legal duty, (2) disobedience of a final equitable decree, (3) disobedi-
ence of an order of the court. Missouri courts are contra. Indiana is
contra as to payment of gross alimony in lump sum upon the theory of
legislative intent. Ohio is in accord with the majority as to all types of
alimony except alimony in lump sum. This type has not yet been the
subject of a supreme court decision. In considering this problem the
court has a choice between the alternatives, (x) alimony in lump sum
is a final judgment over which the court has lost jurisdiction, therefore
it has no power to punish the defaulter in contempt proceedings, (2) as-
suming alimony in lump surfi is a final judgment, the court will look
behind the judgment, see the duty, take jurisdiction and enforce by
imprisonment.
LOWELL M. GOERLICH
EVIDENCE
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A CITY ORDINANCE - STATUS IN RE-
VIEWING COURT
In the original action, a suit to replevy an automobile, the Munici-
pal Court of Cincinnati took judicial notice of Section 74-136 of the
ordinances of Cincinnati. On petition in error, the Court of Appeals
for Hamilton County, in affirming the judgment of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas, stated that the original trial being in the Municipal Court,
the city ordinances were matters of which that court and all succeeding
courts considering the case must take judicial notice. Jackson v. Cope-
Ian, 50 Ohio App. 414, 198 N.E. 596, 3 Ohio Op. 223, 19 Abs. 663
(1935).
One group of jurisdictions in the United States has held that a
reviewing court which would not in an original action take judicial
notice of a municipal ordinance, will not take judicial notice of the
ordinance on reviewing a judgment of a court which did take judicial
notice thereof, unless authorized by statute to do so. Otherwise, the
ordinance can be made known to the court only by being made a part
of the record. State v. Egli, 41 Idaho 422, 238 P. 514 (1925);
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Karchmer v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. Rep. 211, 134 S.W. 700 (1911);
Stutsman v. City of Cheyenne, 18 Wyo. 491, 113 P. 321 (1911);
Lucker v. Commonwealth, 4 Bush 440 (Ky. 1868); State v. Soragan,
40 Vt. 450 (1868); Strickland v. State, 68 Ark. 483 (19oo); Hill v.
City of Itlanta, 125 Ga. 697, 54 S.E. 354 (19o6); City of Tarkio
v. Loyd, 179 Mo. 6oo, 78 S.W. 797 (1904); People v. Averill, 124
Misc. Rep. 383, 208 N.Y.S. 774 (1925)-
Another line of American jurisdiction supports the opposing view.
City of Olympia v. Nickert, i18 Vash. 407, 203 P. 946 (1922); City
of Spokane v. Knight, 96 Wash. 403, 165 P. 105 (1917); Galen Hall
Co. v. Atlantic City, 76 N.J.L. 2o, 68 A. 1092 (19o8); Downing v.
City of Miltonvale, 36 Kan. 740, 14 P. 281 (1887); Town of
Moundsville v. Velton, 35 XV. Va. 217, 13 S.E. 373 (1891). Some
jurisdictions have reached this result by statute. Village of Minneota v.
Martin, 124 Minn. 498, 145 N.W. 383, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 40
(1914), see section 1265 G.S. 1913; Incorporated Town of Scranton
v. Danenbaum, 1O9 Ia. 95, 8o N.W. 221 (1899), see section 692
G. C. Cahill's Stat. 1929 c. 51, sec. 58 (IL.) overruling City of Chicago
v. Lost, 289 IIl. 6o5, 124 N.E. 58o (1919).
The Supreme Court of Ohio has never passed on the question and
the lower courts of the state are in conflict. Some of the Ohio courts
have followed the precedent of the jurisdictions that refuse to take
judicial notice. Nelson v. Berea, 21 O.C.C. 781, 12 C.D. 329
(19O1); Esch v. Elyria, 7 O.C.C. (N.S.) 9, 17 C.D. 446 (1905);
Gates v. Cleveland, 18 O.C.C. (N.S.) 349, 33 C.D. 8o (1911);
Evans v. Wooster, 28 O.C.A. 285 (1914); State v. Lathschaltz, lO
O.N.P. (N.S.) 257, 2o O.D. 390 (191o); State v. McCoy, 14
O.L.A. 363 (933); Euclid v. Bramley, 20 O.C.C. (N.S.) 453, 31
C.D. 396, 15 O.D. 155 (1905). The opposing view was taken in
Strauss v. Conneaut, 3 O.C.C. (N.S.) 445, 13 C.D. 320 (1902);
Keck v. Cincinnati, 3 O.N.P. 253, 4 O.D. 324 (1896); dkerman v.
Lima, 7 O.N.P. 92, 8 O.D. 430 (1898).
The reasoning against the taking of judicial notice is that it would
be a hard rule that would compel the consideration by the court of the
numerous enactments of the municipality which relate to the subject in
controversy.
On the other hand, most of the cases in a trial court are not ap-
pealed. When cases are reversed on appeal it is usually because of some
error in the trial court. It does not seem unreasonable for attorneys to
assume that if there is no error in the trial court, there is no ground for
reversal. This view receives support from the practice of the United
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States Supreme Court, which, in reviewing cases from a state court,
takes judicial notice of everything that a state court would notice. Han-
ley v. Donoghue, n16 U.S. 1, 6 S. Ct. 242, 29 Law Ed. 535 (1885).
It must be admitted, however, that it may be a more difficult matter for
a court to find an ordinance not contained in the record than it is for
the Federal Court to ascertain the statutes of the various states.
It would seem that the view of the jurisdictions refusing to take
judicial notice is based largely on an argument of convenience, the saving
of time and labor of the court that would be required in a search for
the ordinance. The contrary view has certain logical support in holding
that a reviewing court will notice a municipal ordinance if the trial
court was compelled to do so. It is submitted, that the principal case, in
following the latter view, reached the more desirable result.
MAURICE A. YOUNG
INSURANCE
MISSTATEMENT OF AGENT IN APPLICATION WITHOUT
KNOWLEDGE OF INSURED
The plaintiff was solicited by an agent of the defendant insurance
company to take out a health, accident and life policy. The company
wrote no such policies on persons over 49 years of age. There is no
evidence that the insured knew of this. The plaintiff truthfully told
the agent that he was between 58 and 62 years of age, but the agent
fraudulently had the policy issued with the insured designated as being
49 years of age. The policy was delivered to the insured and contained
the above statement. The insured was illiterate and could only read
"a little." The company later cancelled the policy after having paid
two sick benefits. The plaintiff seeks to recover all premiums paid less
amounts paid as sick benefits. Held: That the plaintiff could not re-
cover his premiums as the company had no power to avoid the policy;
that the soliciting agent was the agent of the company by virtue both
of G.C. Sec. 9407 and of the common law principle that it embodies.
McSwain v. Washington Fidelity Nat. Ins. Co., 49 O.A. 342, 3 0.0.
231, 197 N.E. 253 (i934).
It is well settled that a soliciting agent is the agent of the insurer.
Roth v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 123 Neb. 300, 242 N.W. 612
(1932); Van Ross v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 134 Kan. 478, 7 P
(2d) 41 1932); National Life and dccident Ins. Co. of Tenn. v.
Sneed, 4o Ga. App. 131, 149 S.E. 68 (1929); and this is true, ac-
